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Abstract
In this study we aim to understand how GitHub is
used by COVID-19 interest groups for organizing
community archives to protect their knowledge from the
Chinese government’s censorship efforts. We introduce
two case studies of such COVID-19 community archives
published with GitHub that appeared online in early
2020. Using public GitHub repository documentation
and web archive web crawls from the Internet Archive’s
Wayback Machine, we describe how these digital
community archives emerge and exist on the platform,
how knowledge of them circulated on other US based
social media sites and show strategies and tactics these
volunteers used to keep these community archives alive,
resist censorship, and guard the safety of these
collections. We argue that these COVID-19 community
archives are at risk because of their platform
accessibility as much as the content they document, and
that understanding how organizers use GitHub’s
platform affordances is essential to theorizing how
platforms are impacting approaches to preserving
cultural memory.

1. Introduction
Since the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak in
December of 2019, people all over the world have been
using online platforms, mobile phone apps, and social
media to share documents, health information, and
personal experiences about the pandemic’s trajectory.
Shortly after the impact of coronavirus became known,
researchers began to observe the spread of rumors,
health misinformation, conflicting reports, hoaxes and
inaccurate data across the web [1]. Public health
researchers and epidemiologists began to call for
increased access to public health data, vetted sources,
and more peer reviewed research. Legislators and policy
makers began to turn towards the scourge that health
misinformation on platforms can cause in fomenting a
public health crisis and demanded that platforms make
more efforts to moderate. Information researchers,
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historians, journalists and archivists began to call for
digital archiving efforts to document this moment and
ask, in an age of platforms and the aftermath of the crisis
how will we remember this infodemic [2], [3]? The
research reported in this paper responds to these calls,
by examining how communities of volunteers have used
GitHub to create community archives to, in their own
words, remember COVID-19.
In February 2020, activists and journalists began
sharing links on social media platforms like Twitter and
WeChat to community archive projects coming from
China [4], [5]. A handful of community archive projects
organized by Chinese citizens had quickly emerged,
attempting to preserve news stories, personal narratives,
and first-hand accounts of the novel coronavirus
outbreak, anticipating that they would likely be removed
from the Internet by Chinese government censors. Some
of these documentation projects use GitHub, a US-based
platform that allows teams to collaborate, share software
projects and documentation, collaborate with code, and
create repositories of information for people to access
multiple versions of repositories as projects are
developed [6].
Groups of Chinese volunteers started repositories
(known as “repos”) to create collections of documents,
solicit contributions, and coordinate the translation of
first-hand accounts of the pandemic. Initially, GitHub
appeared to be used by volunteers in order to evade state
censorship efforts at blocking citizens’ accounts of the
pandemic from spreading online but many of these
repos have since been taken down, gone private, have
been “404’d” and are no longer accessible on the live
web. While many of the surviving community archive
projects risk being scrubbed from the Internet by
Chinese government censors, it is instructive for
researchers of critical and ethical perspectives of digital
social media to consider how organizers use, subvert,
and protect the knowledge that they seek to preserve
using platforms. GitHub provides observation entry
points for researchers because the platform strives to
provide cloud storage, open access and public
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repositories as primary platform features (as well as
powerful network effects). And like many other
platforms striving to enter into global markets with
information infrastructure, GitHub has a history of
responding to state censorship efforts and takedown
requests from governments.
Platforms present themselves as huge barriers to
digital archiving efforts and remembering the pandemic
because of the way that data flows are commodified,
circulate, and remain accessible to users on the Internet
as public information infrastructure [7]. For example,
open source investigators find that bearing witness and
documenting human rights violations are increasingly
challenged in the face of content moderation policies
that delete and ban evidence on YouTube [8]. Many
racial justice activists and scholars have observed that
social media platforms have become sites where the
ritualized public mourning and remembering of Black
lives who have been brutalized and murdered assumes
content where “death and trauma are continuously reinscribed” [9]. Such content that becomes viral and may
risk desensitizing viewers to the police violence and
brutality that users who post these images seek to
critique and draw awareness to.
These access challenges, among others, such as
datafication and commodification shape and are shaped
by contemporary memory practices that spill across
platforms. We call this the platformization of digital
cultural memory. Here we draw on scholars who
theorize the impact of platforms at the juncture of
digital, economic, and governmental infrastructures
[10], as a process involving human and non-human
actors [11], and as a means for critiquing the
programmability of data from platforms [12]. We
employ the approach of Langlois et. al and use
“disaggregation” to evaluate the functionality and
implications of platform features as they pertain to
Github’s publics and archiving efforts [13]. GitHub
features simultaneously foster and inhibit practices of
documenting journalistic and personal narratives.
Cultural memory becomes institutionalized on the
platform, and platform policies consequently mediate
long-term accessibility and preservation.
In this paper we discuss two case studies of
COVID-19 community archives published using
GitHub that appear to have encountered Chinese
censorship efforts in the first few months of 2020. We
argue that these community archives are at risk because
of their accessibility as much as their content, but that
understanding how organizers use GitHub’s platform
affordances is essential to theorizing how platforms are
shifting the concerns of digital preservation from
storage to ensuring long-term access and authenticity.
Using public GitHub repo documentation and web
archive web crawls from the Internet Archive’s

Wayback Machine (IAWM), we describe how these
digital community archives emerged on GitHub, how
knowledge of them circulated on other social media
platforms and detail some strategies these volunteers
have used to keep these community archives alive, resist
censorship, and guard their safety through translation,
making copies, and other reproduction strategies.
Following on previous ethical and critical digital
social media research published in HICSS, we seek to
show these memory practices beginning on GitHub that
spill over to other platforms are confrontations between
communities and the tools they use to communicate
information [14]. These confrontations are productive
for digital social media scholars because they surface
conflicting values of platforms, government interests,
and communities seeking self-determination over
repositories of information, accessing information
publicly and building community archives that
commemorate victims of the pandemic. What’s at stake
when grassroots organizers and community archivists
use platforms as memory infrastructures? What can we
learn from how community archives have enrolled
platform features into their memory practices, selfdetermination efforts and community-building? After
presenting some background literature, we briefly
describe our methods and limits of the study, then we
provide a statement on our research team’s positionality.
In the fourth and fifth sections we introduce two case
studies of Chinese community archives documenting
COVID-19 using GitHub. The paper finishes by
discussing the platformization of digital cultural
memory and the need for research that examines how
community archives are created, accessed, and impacted
by platform features.

2. Background literature
2.1 Community Archives
The GitHub repos that we researched are both
identified as archives and community efforts at
documenting and preserving memories of the
coronavirus by Chinese users. In documentation and in
news coverage of these efforts, organizers of the repos
identify themselves as Chinese citizens who are
concerned “volunteers”, “organizers”, and “netizens”
committed to collecting personal accounts of their
experiences, which in addition to the pain and trauma of
pandemic also include censorship and threats from the
government. As such, we take these creators’
identification and efforts on their own terms and
consider these repos to be digital community archives
that are organized and enacted on GitHub where the
platform operates as an intermediary between users and
third parties such as advertisers or government

Page 2545

regulators. We argue that these COVID-19 community
archives materialized in response to misrepresentations
and absences of personal narratives, but also efforts to
address health misinformation, suppression of on-theground first-person accounts, and government
censorship of online personal experiences of the
pandemic in China.
As people have adopted new digital technologies—
from digital cameras to email listservs and Facebook
groups—community archives have increasingly
leveraged digital tools on the Internet. Some initiatives
are entirely organized and accessed via platforms like
Instagram. Community archives are defined as nontraditional collections and archival communities made
up of people who are not well-documented, or not
documented at all, by traditional cultural heritage
institutions like archives, libraries, or museums [10].
The critical archival theorist Michelle Caswell has
argued for the more precise description of “marginalised
identity-based community archives” in order to
distinguish from other kinds of community archives
which may come from dominant or oppressive power
structures that ultimately maintain their dominance
through preservation [11, p. 23]. Thus, marginalized
identity-based community archives are formed by
people not only to create documentation around their
experiences but also to counteract misrepresentations
and dominant documentation practices.1 Crucially, for
the COVID-19 community archives and other activists’
documentation efforts, GitHub is a free, open, and
publicly available platform in China. While other USbased platforms such as Google and Facebook are
presently banned, many Western platforms with
enterprise and e-commerce purposes have sought to
grow their markets in China while maneuvering the
Great Firewall [15].
Researchers have observed that as community
archive organizations have transitioned to born-digital
records and online communication for access they
increasingly use platforms to capture documentation
from social media activity, circulate information
resources, and even collaborate on writing projects [16].
However, many archival scholars and media studies
researchers have examined the challenges that groups
face when establishing digital community archives that
reflect their values, support their needs, and protect their
knowledge as minoritized groups [17]–[19]. Platforms
frequently update features, policies, and affordances
that can impact users in a variety of ways that put their
identities, community practices, and commemoration
with platformed content at risk [20], [21]. As such,
digital community archives using platforms can at once

enact self-determination efforts while risking
oppressive scrutiny, or even ambivalence and
obfuscation in relation to the platform’s governance.

1

yourself in history: community archives and the fight against
symbolic annihilation. The Public Historian, 36(4), 26-37.

Caswell has theorized this elsewhere as the “symbolic annihilation”
of minoritized groups. For more see: Caswell, M. (2014). Seeing

2.2 GitHub
Since 2005, GitHub has operated as cloud-based
hosting services for the Git version control system
ensuring documentation of non-linear collaborative
development of software [22]. “Git” is a version control
system that offers a method of open collaboration for
distribution enabling documentation of workflow
through producing working copies of a repository for
contributors and smooth merging processes. The open
source software project has grown immensely popular,
with a recent survey by Stack Overflow revealing that
nearly 90% of respondents utilize Git in their coding
process [23]. GitHub self-articulates as a space for
developers to come together and work on code as
reflected in the more than 100 million repositories of
code hosted on the site [22], [24]. In 2018 Microsoft
acquired GitHub and since then has expanded its scope,
describing itself as an online platform for connection,
storage, and retrieval for teams and enterprise users.
GitHub as a platform has increasingly capitalized its
services to private companies around the world as
enterprise software for documentation management for
3 million organizations. Approximately 60% of Fortune
500 companies use GitHub for their internal
development and documentation processes [22].
While the platform makes money from tailored
enterprise plans with varying capabilities for
administrative actions, security, and support [25], there
are many features available to users for free, allowing
them to publish and make actions and documentation
public on the Internet. Many thousands of individual
users use the free version of GitHub for communityoriented endeavors [26], and groups in China have used
GitHub repos to organize actions and volunteer efforts
for many years. For example, 996.ICU is a group of
information technology workers fighting to disrupt the
9am-9pm, 6 days per week schedule, and they use
GitHub as a bulletin board for visibility and labor
advocacy [27]. Because GitHub is not blocked by
Chinese Internet service providers (ISPs), it is also used
to document and publish content that would otherwise
be censored and inaccessible. For more than four years,
prominent anti-censorship repos have been utilizing
GitHub to combat Chinese government censorship and
advocate for free speech [28].
It is important to interrogate the value of such a
platform for preservation of information as much as it
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affords the ability to access materials that are designed
to be openly available online. For our purposes here, its
software documentation and versioning control features
are of great interest to the study of community archive
practices because they capture chains of evidence in
metadata information about repository updates. Both
analog and digital archiving communities believe in the
importance of tracing and confirming provenance. In
this regard, GitHub provides a constant chain of
documentation on additions, changes, merges, and
contributors. This metadata information can be
understood as valuable contextual information and
valuable provenance. The chain of provenance is
continuously preserved within the structure of the
platform and continuously produces metadata on
changes to each line of code or other form of file.
However, this reliable and openly accessible
provenance information can also put users at risk of
censorship crackdowns as part of China’s Internet
censorship and surveillance policies.
2.3 Platforms and infrastructuralization in China
Scholars who research China’s Internet governance
typically focus on techno-nationalist influences in the
development of digital platforms, ranging from data
flow policy and its localization regimes [29], to the
programmability and “infrastructuralization” of
platforms such as WeChat [30]. As a result of China’s
Great Firewall and longstanding censorship policies
since the establishment of ISPs [15], [31], China’s
citizenry has practiced self-censorship in online and
digital communications [32]. In their discussion of the
Chinese model of platform infrastructuralization
through Tencent’s WeChat, Plantin and de Seta
emphasize the protectionist environment where
platforms like Tencent and Weibo allow governmental
control and user surveillance in an effort to become,
essentially, public information infrastructures in China.
US-based and European platform companies aim to
become public information infrastructures in many
contexts as well, but eschewing state oversight for more
private, corporate regulatory frameworks. As Western
platforms such as GitHub attempt assert their
“infrastructural ambitions” in Chinese markets,
researchers can witness the infrastructuralization of
digital communication services such as software
development and knowledge repositories unfold, while
observing how foreign privatized firms like Microsoft
must negotiate China’s techno-nationalist platform
policies [30, p. 259]. In building on previous research
examining Internet censorship in China and digital
communication technologies [15], [29], [32], this study
highlights how governments, platforms, and users can
be at odds with the values that appear to be ‘baked in’ to

platform features, such as public versioning, open
access to documents, and cloning repositories. Platform
confrontations like the ones we present here instantiate
values while engendering power, revealing how a
functional sovereignty is enforced by platforms as
intermediaries of states (or alongside them) [7]. These
confrontations can also illustrate how alternative uses of
platform mechanisms are possible, revealing the stakes
of platforms in and across nation states, and society.

3. Methodology
In this study we aim to understand how GitHub
repositories are being used by COVID-19 interest
groups for organizing community archives and memory
infrastructures, while protecting their knowledge from
government censorship. How do groups build, organize
and provide access to their GitHub community
archives? How do they use platform features to protect,
preserve, and represent community documentation? In
addressing these research questions, we show how
public GitHub repos can be cloned, forked, and taken
private in order to preserve personal narratives and
counteract government censorship and health
misinformation. Due to the sensitivity of these
materials, we decided to only use data and repositories
which have been already published and cited by Chinese
and international news outlets. We primarily use
contextual metadata from documentation describing
each archive’s GitHub repo, and not the records that
they have been published as some contain identifying
information, have been since made “private” or have
been unpublished or are likely to be taken down. While
all these sources were publicly available online at the
beginning of our analysis (in Spring 2020), some have
disappeared and many more are likely to be deleted. One
strategy that we find and report on when users copy, fork
or clone these sources. Even as we investigate and report
on these archival practices, we seek to protect these
copies and clones from censorship efforts too. Unless
Chinese and international news outlets have previously
published these repos and usernames, we do not identify
users in these research findings, in order to protect the
privacy of these GitHub users and the confidentiality of
these important repos.
Documentation about public GitHub repos and user
accounts are publicly available online, including
metadata on account updates and actions. Each user
account page contains information about the
repositories that user has created. GitHub automatically
generates a data visualization concerning activity in the
form of issues and pull requests called. Contribution
activity is also documented in the form of a timeline
showing which commits are linked to which repository
(Figure
1.).
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news reporting. Reading this digital evidence in concert
enabled us to visualize and trace how two teams of
Chinese community archivists have worked to
document narratives concerning COVID-19 with
GitHub
creating
community
archives.
3.1 Limitations

Figure 1. Contribution activity timeline and
visualization of a GitHub user account.
The timeline feature is mirrored within each
GitHub repo document activity. To trace the arc of these
community archive initiatives, we analyzed existing
repo timelines and web archives of the platform. This
enabled consideration of the changing scope and added
content in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and
domestic politics. For the repos which have since been
made private, we utilized the Internet Archive’s
Wayback Machine web archives. Public repos on
GitHub are frequently crawled for web archives like the
Internet Archive, so we were able to utilize provenance
information from the web archives of the GitHub pages
previously operational through comparing snapshots of
each repo’s original URL. For more on this method of
using provenance information from IAWM web craws,
see [33].
International media coverage of the public health
crisis, COVID-19 documentation initiatives, and
Chinese web content provided further source context for
the climate in which these community archives projects
operated. Further, Chinese and English social media
posts provided reactionary commentary and personal
insight into the status of these community archive
projects as they emerged and were subject to censorship.
In observing these repo actions from web archived
URLs and comparing them to news stories and other
social media posts published at the same time, we were
able to construct a timeline of events, actions, and in
some cases verified motivations from organizers
describing these changes in repo documentation and

It is imperative to state the limits of this research
when observing archival practices in ‘real-time’ as
organizers respond to government censorship and
negotiate layers of accessibility on platforms. To avoid
further highlighting and naming users operating in this
vulnerable and quickly-changing context, we have
chosen not to publish usernames or cite content we
know remains at risk. As a result of masking sources
(and users’ identities) that are still available online, we
limit the primary sources and data drawn upon for
evidence and presented to readers for verification to
instances previously reported in media coverage.
Translation of these sources are another limitation
we acknowledge in this study. Both repositories
featured some English prose in their self-written
descriptions of identities, motivations, and archive
content but most documents were in Mandarin Chinese.
With the understanding that word selection in bilingual
texts carries weight and power, a native speaker
contributed Chinese-to-English translations of the data.2
This research focuses on the occurrence of these
community digital archives, and our translator
collaborator was able to assist in translating materials
that were key to understanding the trajectory of these
repos and confirming semantic meanings.
Critics of our choice to interpret archival efforts and
memory practices so shortly after they unfolded online
during a time of great upheaval during the pandemic
would be right to caution their generalizability,
especially since the end of the pandemic is yet to arrive.
However, we believe that these findings from the
‘beginnings’ of community documentation responses to
the pandemic will be meaningful in future accounts and
theories of information practices documenting the
COVID-19 aftermath, as well as understanding the
impact of platform affordances on minoritized
communities, efforts at self-determination and their
archives.
3.2 Statement on our positionality
We acknowledge our team positionality and our
subjectivities as researchers as we approach the topic
and interpret these findings. Our positionality informs

2

Due to the nature of the documents and the context of the research,
our research team translator wishes to remain anonymous.
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not only our individual perspectives, but perspectives on
methodology and construction of the research process.
As white, cisgender researchers, both co-authors have
inherently benefited from the structural racism of the
academy and the higher education landscape in the US.
Having both been trained and working at American
institutions, we are cognizant of the centrism of Western
scholarship and the Euro-centric methodologies which
inform our understanding of information studies,
archival practices, and cultural stewardship of digital
memory and platforms. As a result of our locations and
institutional affiliation, we have had open Internet
access and continue to be able to access the web with
limited concerns for web tracing, tracking, and
censorship. We recognize that each of these privileges
impact our research positionality when investigating
digital archives, community preservation, and
information networks in China and beyond.

4. Ensuring Access with Translations
One COVID-19 community archive projects,
“/nCovMemory,” in particular illustrates coordination
and tactics that community archivists use to confront
Chinese Internet censorship of speech in China while
using platform features for collaboration and managing
documentation. According to /nCovMemory repo’s
description, the archive began collecting accounts in
January 2020. Shortly after the first /nCovMemory repo
was created the account’s owner, Memoryhonest
created another repo entitled, /nCovMemory-en
featuring English translations of the same articles
published in the Chinese /nCovMemory repo [34].
The repo has a document that introduces the
purpose and motivations of the team of volunteers.
These community archivists call themselves the Chengji
Translation team, a small group of volunteers
committed to remembrance through authentic
documentation. From January to February 2020, the
Chengji Translation Team posted English translations of
first-hand reports from the /nCovMemory repo and
published them to the /nCovMemory-en repo.
US journalists interviewed the creators of the
/nCovMemory GitHub repository and reported that a
team of 7 volunteers had been archiving media reports,
as well as non-fiction works, and personal narratives
that conflicted with Chinese state media reports of the
pandemic on the ground [35]. After the US media
coverage of the archive project, the first-hand accounts
and articles in Chinese as well as the English

3

Repos that have been taken down, unpublished, or have gone from
public to private each display the same ‘404 not found’ page dialog,
so it is difficult to infer motivations without verification from the

translations stopped being published to both GitHub
repos.
In April, the Chinese repo /nCovMemory began to
display a 404 page according to archived webcrawls of
the website from the Internet Archive’s Wayback
Machine [36]. Concurrently, it was reported that
organizers of similar COVID-19 community archives
using GitHub were becoming targets of a Chinese
government crackdown censoring accounts of the
pandemic [35]. Some Chinese GitHub repo creators
were arrested and put under house arrest, while others
are reported to still be missing [37]. While the
/nCovMemory-en English translation GitHub repo is
still publicly available online, the Chinese language
repo /nCovMemory has been taken down or gone
private [38].3 However, before the Memoryhonest
account went quiet and took down public access to the
/nCovMemory, both the Chinese and English repos
were downloaded and republished as cloned repos by
other GitHub users. Such clones of the original
/nCovMemory community archive allow those
interested to continue to “browse [their] archives,” of
the English translations but also access the materials
through different copied repos, including clones that
have now been published outside of GitHub as well.
For the Chengji translation team, the act of
translation ensures a broader audience, providing a
means for more readers to witness first-hand accounts
that are not represented currently in Chinese media
coverage. In describing their motivations in the repo
ReadMe and “about” section, the volunteers regard
these acts of translation as both resistance and selfdetermination in giving authentic accounts. They
acknowledge the likelihood of the repo receiving more
traction, longevity, audience reach and endurance of the
materials if other versions of the Chinese collections are
translated into English and posted in the English
language repo.

5. Lots of Clones Keeps Stuff Safe
The self-articulated memory practices and
preservation efforts guiding /nCovMemory can be
observed across GitHub in other repos emerging in the
early months of 2020. On February 4th, just over a week
after Wuhan was placed under government-mandated
quarantine [39], another repo, /wuhan2019, emerged on
GitHub [40]. The archive’s mission was clearly
articulated in the repository’s description, proclaiming:
“Lest we forget this pandemic, or at least I won’t forget”
acting as an archive for mainstream media articles that
account holder. In this case, published interviews with the
Memoryhonest account organizers report that they went ‘private’ in
response to pressure from government censorship efforts.
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organizers anticipate will be censored or removed [41].
As Chinese citizens began to voice concern about
accuracy and access to information, both /nCovMemory
and /wuhan2019 appear as community efforts to
document mainstream narratives, facts, and figures
relating to coronavirus and referencing each other's
efforts, while bolstering documentation with personal
narratives and first-hand accounts. Both scholarly media
analysis and journalism highlighted the beginning of
2020 as a period of increasing worry, agony, and despair
over not only the virus but the government’s response to
limit and censor oppositional content originating from
China [28].
In the context of limited access to reliable public
health
information
concerning
coronavirus,
/wuhan2019 functions to document disappearing
coronavirus information as well as misinformation
preserving both reliable and unreliable accounts.
Amongst the state sponsored media emerging that
COVID-10 community archives sought to document
using GitHub repos, the /wuhan2019 repository
dedicates itself to preserving mainstream media articles.
The repo contains a ReadMe file written by the creator,
outlining the mission and introducing the trajectory of
the initiative. It has been updated as the archive grows,
illustrating the narrative changes and enduring
motivations of those creating and maintaining the repos.
The language describes a reality in which the actors
expect all the documents hosted on the repo to “be
erased by CCP [sic: Chinese Community Party]
someday” [42]. In recirculating previously published
online documents as PDF files the /wuhan2019 acts as a
curator anticipating both a present and a future in which
these reports will be destroyed.
The documents are uploaded, added, and preserved
within the /wuhan2019 repository and are grouped by
media outlet into a folder structure of chronologically
organized publications. The earliest article dates to late
December 2019, and the latest commit (or version) to
the repository on April 24th, 2020 [41]. 43 news outlets
are represented with varying amounts of documentation
per outlet. The outlets range from Xiao Xiang Morning
News published in Changsha capital of China’s Hunan
province to GQ China, a popular men’s magazine.
Within each folder, articles are preserved as individual
digital objects with naming conventions including date
and article title. For example, the /wuhan2019/New
York Times (
) repository hosts 319 pdfs of Chinese
New York Times articles covering the outbreak in China
from US perspectives that were published in the Chinese
version of the newspaper.
Among the documents stored in /wuhan2019 are
internationally-recognized features on the evolution,
ramifications, and human-toll of the virus in China and
abroad [35]. On February 3rd, the magazine branch of

Caixin Media published a 40,000 word cover story
chronicling the impact of how stalled dissemination of
information pertaining to the virus led to the scale and
scope of crisis within Wuhan [35]. With such a critical
stance of local government, publishers who ran articles
such as this assumed swift censorship, accepting the risk
of deletion and forced edit by government censors.
Lestweforget was then busy, locating published articles
that would soon be destroyed or censored.
Another genre preserved within the archive are
diary-like first person accounts reflecting intimate
reflections. Such was the case with the diaries of the
writer Fang Fang—a well-known literary figure whose
works have historically concerned the lower strata of
society—published on social media. As noted by the
Chinese public and international outlets, each of her
accounts were consistently and immediately deleted by
censors within approximately an hour [43]. /wuhan2019
hosts 57 of Fang’s diary entries. Such personal
testimonies like Fang Fang’s are pivotal in shaping
understanding of the concerns and constraints which
shaped Hubei in the context of COVID-19. Reading
commentary allows one to understand the intrinsic
details of events both personal and universal. These
types of historical accounts and individual narratives of
crises are pertinent when access to accurate information
is inhibited or controlled by oppressive governments. As
posed by the Chinese author and academic Yan Lianke,
without documentation like Fang’s which digitally pens
the experience, emotions, and socio-cultural landscape,
“What would we have heard? What would we have
seen?” [44].
The maintenance of /wuhan2019 with new,
reputable articles before censorship edits, alterations,
and deletion from the government continued throughout
February, March, and the beginning of April. As the toll
of the virus exponentially grew, so did Chinese
censorship mechanisms. In response, social media users
began to use fictional languages like Klingon and
Elvish, or emojis in their posts to try and evade censors
using automated language identification trackers [4].
With the disappearance of three individuals
affiliated with another Chinese GitHub project,
Terminus2049, and the lack of additions to
2019nCovMemory before disappearance, the landscape
of community archiving using Git was rapidly changing.
On April 26th, /wuhan2019 suspended contributions
while maintaining status as a public repository. In a
recent update to the ReadMe, the decision to suspend
updates to the repository came in part because the
pandemic was showing signs of decline in China, and in
part due to the fear of having identity disclosed and
personal security compromised [38]. As concisely
articulated by a GitHub user who messaged the
repository and subsequently made public in a recent
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statement, “We all want to remember history, but there
are always people who do not want us to remember”
[38]. On June 5th, however, an update was published
reasserting the aim of the project and calling for the
release of the Terminus2049 contributors, and freedom
of speech in China [45].

6. Discussion
Platforms like GitHub promise an easier way to
collaborate, host information online (like code and
documents) and share access to team projects. We see
many of the GitHub features that support collaboration
used in innovative ways by community archives, from
taking a repo private to protect volunteers, to cloning or
forking a parent repository to make public copies for
ensuring further access. Each of these tactics can
outmaneuver China’s Great Firewall of censoring
speech, at least for a while. These Chinese community
archive repos (and their clones) documenting personal
COVID-19 experiences surface ideological differences
between US-based platforms, the Chinese government’s
Internet censorship efforts, and the desire of
communities to document and share their personal
experiences of the pandemic. For scholars concerned
with power, access to knowledge, self-determination
efforts through commemoration, what can we learn
from how these community archives of personal
COVID-19 experiences use platforms like GitHub?
In the aftermath of earthquakes and pandemics,
platforms like WeChat and Twitter become public
information infrastructures that shape and are shaped by
new information practices. Platforms have also become
venues
where
communities
coordinate
and
commemorate trauma, violence, and loss with
documentation. Information historian Megan Finn, has
shown in her work on information practices before and
after disasters, private platforms like Facebook convene
groups of people in novel ways with algorithms,
location data, and affinity groups [46]. However, the
ways in which platforms convene such publics are
generally unknown, their mechanisms are ‘black
boxed’, providing outsiders with low visibility into their
construction, development, and evaluation. We can add
another process to the black box with the COVID-19
community archives ‘going dark’ because researchers
have little ways of knowing when government
censorship via takedown requests has occurred, or
whether ISPs are blocking access to URLs if platforms
do not publish evidence of complying with such
requests. It is too soon to confirm whether the repos that
went dark and are now 404s are the result of take down
requests from government, censorship intimidation or
police custody, or simply the chilling of publishing
public repos.

Whether it has been removed or gone private, the
404 of /nCovMemory repo shows there are conflicting
values of access, commemoration, and control over
first-hand accounts of the coronavirus pandemic.
Information science and STS scholars have examined
the epistemic tensions that platforms represent when
they are used as infrastructures to preserve heritage,
document evidence, or to commemorate people we’ve
lost [9], [21]. By specifically examining platform
developments where data stewardship and digital
preservation strategies are enacted by users of
platforms, we can more fully understand the impact of
platformization on our digital cultural memory and the
future of archives [12].
These platform accounts also reveal the power of
governance, sovereignty, and state censorship
campaigns in and through features like public repos over
digital cultural memory. The /wuhan2019 repo provides
a lens for considering how, in an effort to combat
censored news narratives, repo creators become
historical curators of both COVID-19 accounts and
subject to censorship themselves as platform users. In
making commits and changes to the archive to protect
these collected contributions, the contributor to
/wuhan2019 authoritatively appraises the changing
informational landscape and government suppression of
health information in the media. On March 17, 2020,
Lestweforget issued an update to /wuhan2019 noting the
suspended additions of two media outlets coverage of
the novel coronavirus. The commit described that due to
the “quality” of the articles being published, items from
China Business News and Xinmin Weekly would be
stopped being included [45]. The /wuhan2019 repo
updates consequently serve as records of reputability or
lack thereof, and the performative (and powerful)
actions of contributing to community archives. With a
public repository, user activity of the creator and those
participating in community archiving efforts are
represented in the form of public notification and digital
records.
Like the /nCovMemory repo, /wuhan2019 attempts
to depict the realities of lived experience of coronavirus
in Wuhan, Hubei province, and beyond. In contrast to a
cultural landscape where narratives of experience were
being erased by censorship and distorting societal
representation and collective memory, Lestweforget
contends the “INTERNET never forgets” [40]. The
feelings and ideals motivating both COVID-19
community archives’ repos are facing the confrontation
between memory, state oppression, and access to
information within platforms and across them. With
community archives like /wuhan 2019 and
/nCovMemory, we conclude by asking ourselves if
platforms are being used as community archives, what
can platforms learn from users that leverage GitHub’s
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features for connecting communities to information
resources and knowledge by usurping Chinese Internet
policy with a US-based platform?

7. Conclusion
We began this research to investigate platform
dynamics in relation to memory practices and
community archives.4 By examining how GitHub is
being used by volunteers for organizing COVID-19
community archives, we are able to show how platform
affordances can be used to evade suppression of Chinese
content published online with team translation
organizing, cloning, and migrating content. Each of
these emerging and innovative community archive
practices uses code, documentation, and software
repository features appear to be new strategies of
memory and resistance using the GitHub platform. But,
as the disappeared repos illustrate, China continues to
suppress personal narratives and media coverage of the
coronavirus pandemic. Platforms, like GitHub, can
leveraged to extend suppression by putting users and
their publicly available content at risk because
governments can be users of platforms too.
Whether enforcing the power of states, disciplining
bodies through institutions, or building counternarratives that resist hegemony, archives have always
been implicated in projects of domination. Researchers
of digital cultural memory should pay attention to the
platformization of memory practices and community
archives. These confrontations over accessing personal
accounts of the pandemic in China by organizing
community archives on GitHub remind us again that it
remains to be seen where platforms see themselves in
this struggle over what will be remembered and what
we’ll sooner forget.
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